Home > Uncategorized > War of Independence and Civil War in Tipperary and West Waterford

War of Independence and Civil War in Tipperary and West Waterford

 The Irish Times now  has had the liberal Free Stater Fintan O’Toole, The Jesuit Free Stater and supporter of the Iraq war,Seamus Murphy, and now  the Learned Professor Ferriter denouncing Sologheadbeg

FREE STATERS, Representing the Irish Rich, WERE MORE MURDEROUS THAN THE BLACK AND TANS—-4 of THE SEVENTY SEVEN WERE EXECUTED IN ROSCREA, 9 MORE REPUBLICAN PRISONERS MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD IN CUSTODY IN TIPPERARY

By the end of the Civil War the Free State government had authorised the execution of 77; this was 53 more than the British had executed(24) during the War of Independence; There are no conclusive figures for the number of unofficial executions (murders in cold blood in custody by Free State troops) of captured Anti-Treaty fighters, but Republican officer Todd Andrews put the figure for “unauthorised killings” at 153.

One of the 77 executed was republican leader Erskine Childers. He was sentenced to execution by a Free State military tribunal for possession of a small calibre automatic pistol held in his bedroom. The gun had been a gift from Michael Collins. While his appeal against the sentence was still pending, Childers was executed on 24 November 1922 by firing squad at the Beggars Bush Barracks.

Important Reading on War of Independence and the Civil War and Lessons for To-day:  Book Ernie O Malley-The Singing Flame; Book C Desmond Greaves: Liam Mellowes and The Irish Revolution;  Book D.R. O’C Lysaght: The Munster Creamery Soviets  ; Book C Desmond Greaves: History of ITGWU; D.R.O’C Lysaght: Story of the Limerick Soviet;Paper Conor Kostick : The Irish Working Class and the War of Independence. Book Arthur Mitchel : Labour in Irish Politics 1890-1930-The Irish Labour Movement in an Age of Revolution. Case Histories  Brian Kenny: When Ireland Went Red;Also  Philip Ferguson   : https://theirishrevolution.wordpress.com/2011/08/30/the-working-class-and-the-national-struggle-1916-1921/

See also onthis Blog   Lessons of the Civil War for Today   https://wp.me/pKzXa-OT

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British Army General Montgomery (Monty) SAYS BRITISH ARMY in Ireland Could Not Be As Ruthless As THE FREE STATE IN SUPPRESSING THE IRISH REBELLION. THAT IS WHY LLoyd George Agreed to a TRUCE https://wp.me/pKzXa-12n

“The only way forward therefore (for Britain) was to give them [the Irish] some form of self-government, and let them squash the rebellion themselves; they are the only people who could really stamp it out, and they are still trying to do so and as far as one can tell they seem to be having a fair amount of success.”

“My own view is that to win a war of this sort, you must be ruthless. Oliver Cromwell, or the Germans, would have settled it in a very short time. Nowadays public opinion precludes such methods, the nation would never allow it, and the politicians would lose their jobs if they sanctioned it. That being so, I consider that Lloyd George was right in what he did, if we had gone on we could probably have squashed the rebellion as a temporary measure, but it would have broken out again like an ulcer the moment we removed the troops. I think the rebels would probably [have] refused battles, and hidden their arms etc. until we had gone….

Letter to Colonel Arthur Ernest Percival of the Essex Regiment 1923

BL Montgomery(MONTY) was appointed brigade major in the 17th Infantry Brigade of the British Army in January 1921. The brigade was stationed in County Cork, carrying out counter-insurgency operations during the final stages of the Irish War of Independence

Montgomery came to the conclusion that the conflict could not be won without harsh measures, and that self-government for Ireland was the only feasible solution; He wrote later

“My own view is that to win a war of this sort, you must be ruthless. Oliver Cromwell, or the Germans, would have settled it in a very short time. Nowadays public opinion precludes such methods, the nation would never allow it, and the politicians would lose their jobs if they sanctioned it. That being so, I consider that Lloyd George was right in what he did, if we had gone on we could probably have squashed the rebellion as a temporary measure, but it would have broken out again like an ulcer the moment we removed the troops. I think the rebels would probably [have] refused battles, and hidden their arms etc. until we had gone…..

The only way forward therefore (for Britain) was to give them [the Irish] some form of self-government, and let them squash the rebellion themselves; they are the only people who could really stamp it out, and they are still trying to do so and as far as one can tell they seem to be having a fair amount of success.

 

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Months before the 1918 General Election and the Soloheadbeg Ambush The British Authorities Had Committed an Act of War Against The Irish People! https://wp.me/pKzXa-12n

“German Plot” 1918 -150 Sinn Féin national and local leaders  were arrested and interned without trial by the British Authorities on the night of 16–17 May, 1918, and taken to prisons in England.

Those arrested included the great Tipperary republican Pierce McCan who was elected to the first Dáil but was unable to attend . He later died in a British Prison

34 of the Snn Féin TDs elected in 1918 were interned in British jails. Others were “on the run”. Only 27 Sinn Féin TDs attended in the Mansion House on Jan 21, 1919

Among the national leaders arrested were Eamonn Devalera and Constance Markevicz

https://www.rte.ie/centuryireland/index.php/articles/sinn-fein-leaders-arrested-over-alleged-german-plot

RTE:  Sinn Féin leaders arrested over alleged ‘German plot’

Dublin, 18 May 1918 – In a dramatic midnight swoop, police and military authorities have arrested leading members of the Sinn Féin movement. Among them were a number of MPs and the party’s president, Éamon de Valera, who was seized at his home in Greystones, Co. Wicklow and taken to Kingstown Police Station.

At 1 am, Constance Markievicz was apprehended in Rathmines. Already in custody by then was Darrell Figgis, party secretary, who was seized at his home a couple of hours earlier by several soldiers and half a dozen detectives. Figgis was taken away in a lorry to Dublin Castle.

In Belfast, Denis McCullough and Seán McEntee were also arrested.

Others detained included Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Féin and editor of NationalityWilliam Cosgrave MPJoseph McGuinness MPDr Richard Hayes and Seán Milroy.

Letter, dated 3 June 1918, to the Chief Secretary from the brother of Seán (J.R.) Etchingham who was ‘taken from his home at midnight on Tuesday 21st May without any charge been preferred against him’. His family learned from the newspaper the following day that he had been ‘deported to England’ and since then his brother had not been able to trace his whereabouts. (Image: National Archives of Ireland, CSO RP 1918 15229)

Proclamation
The reasons for these arrests were given by a proclamation issued by the Lord Lieutenant, Viscount French, and signed by the Chief Secretary, Edward Shortt, both of whom were recently appointed.

The proclamation, published this morning, alleged that the government in Ireland had discovered that a seditious element had been engaging in ‘treasonable communication with Germany’. The arrests were intended to crush what it termed as this ‘German Plot’. The proclamation further urges ‘all loyal subjects’ to assist the government in suppressing this treachery.

Also, in a move, seen by many as a softening in the official attitude towards recruitment in Ireland, the proclamation states that authorities will take steps to ‘facilitate and encourage voluntary enlistment in Ireland…in the hope that without resort to compulsion the contribution of Ireland’ to Britain’s forces ‘may be brought up to its proper strength’.

The uproar caused by the passing of the Military Service (Ireland) Act last month, led to massive anti-conscription rallies all over the country and a general strike.

The Belfast Newsletter, thinks the government has been unduly influenced by this unrest and accuses this, and the previous, administration of pursuing ‘the path of political expediency in its dealing with Irish nationalism and Irish treason too long’.

On the other hand, the Irish Independent has argued that the juxtaposition of details of the plot with the question of military service exposes the (British )proclamation as an exercise in cheap propaganda.

[Editor’s note: This is an article from Century Ireland, a fortnightly online newspaper, written from the perspective of a journalist 100 years ago, based on news reports of the time.]

————————————————————-Statement By Seamus Healy TD (Tipperary)   on the Centenary of the First 32-County Dáil and the Ambush at Sologheadbeg

I am Proud to Serve the People of Tipperary and I am proud of the Action of our Volunteers at Sologheadbeg

On this, the hundredth anniversary of the first meeting of Dáil Éireann, we can remember with pride the hand that the people of Tipperary had in the creation of the Ireland of today.  It is my very great privilege to serve the people of Tipperary in Dáil Éireann today, one hundred years on.

During the 1918 General Election campaign, Sinn Féin stood candidates on the basis of an abstentionist policy.  If elected, the Sinn Féin representatives would abstain from the Westminster parliament.  All four candidates returned for the Tipperary constituency in 1918 were Sinn Féin abstentionists and so duly abstained from Westminster and instead gave their allegiance to the first meeting of a thirty-two county Dáil Éireann (The Convention for Ireland) in the Mansion House in Dublin.  The people of Tipperary had given the strongest possible mandate against Home Rule:  Independence or nothing!

The First Tipperary Teachtaí Dála were an impressive lot.  Pierce McCan representing Tipperary East; Joseph McDonagh representing North Tipperary; PJ Moloney representing South Tipperary and Seamus Burke representing Mid-Tipperary.  In neighbouring County Waterford, Cathal Brugha, now immortalised in song and story, enjoyed a very impressive victory there over the Redmondite candidate.

McCan could not attend the First Dáil as was “faoi ghlas ag Gallaibh” imprisoned in England, where he died later that year of influenza.  It is a testament to the greatness of Pierce McCan and to his importance in national affairs that, Cathal Brugha, our First Ceann Comhairle and Pro-Tem President, Chief of Staff of the IRA, gave the oration at his funeral.

Joseph McDonagh was of course, the brother of Thomas McDonagh, the executed 1916 revolutionary and leader, teacher and poet.  Seamus Burke from Borrisoleigh was unable to attend as he was hard at work raising funds for the underground Irish Republic in the United States.  And PJ Moloney of Tipperary Town, founder of the now legendary 3rd Tipperary Brigade, who had been imprisoned after 1916 was elected by a three to one majority over the Home Rule candidate.  The people of Tipperary were proud to have the opportunity to elect these men of word and deed; men of action.

The role of women during this period in Irish history is often hidden but nonetheless crucial.  Members of Cumann na mBan such as Mary O’Dwyer of Coleraine, Co. Tipperary, who was Captain of E Company, 7th Battalion, 3rd Tipperary Brigade and others like her who gave much needed shelter and support throughout the War of Independence, at great personal cost.

It is noteworthy that all successful candidates of the island of Ireland in the 1918 General Election were invited to the First Dáil and that this Dáil was not a twenty-six county Dáil as we have today but rather it had representatives from Derry City, Tyrone North West and Fermanagh South.  These were later joined in the Second Dáil of 1921 by three more representing Armagh, Down and Tyrone.  What a great pity it is that a hundred years on, our island still remains divided with those in the six counties effectively without any representation at all, being ruled by a parliament in London.

Whether by fate or by design, the meeting of the First Dáil also shares its anniversary with the opening salvo in the War of Independence; the Sologheadbeg Ambush.  The action taken at Sologheadbeg mapped out the only way an oppressed and impoverished people could defeat the largest Empire the world has ever seen.  And the military conflict during the War of Independence can be seen as a part of a much broader mass movement at that time against the rule of British landlords, capitalists and the wealthiest of the Irish establishment whose riches the British rule of law in Ireland guaranteed.

Let us not forget that the British attempt to bring in conscription in 1917 was met by mass opposition including a general strike.  That anti-conscription movement was co-ordinated at a conference held in the Mansion House at which large swathes of Irish society were represented.  When the British were forced to withdraw the threat of conscription, it gave Irish people a sense of their own power and the movement gained momentum.

In the same year as the Sologheadbeg Ambush, our neighbours in Limerick City, headed by the Limerick Trades Council in revolt against British restrictions, seized control of that City and set up the Limerick Soviet, even going so far as to print their own money.  Similar small-scale soviets took place in creameries all around Munster including my home town of Clonmel in the years immediately following.  During the War of Independence, there were also waves of farm labourer strikes and land seizures by poor farmers, the importance of which in forcing the British to capitulate and offer a truce, should not be underestimated.

The action at Sologheadbeg marked a turning point in the history of our country but also in the history of the world.   Irish rebels inspired by the action at Sologheadbeg went on to demonstrate to all of the oppressed peoples of the world how one of the greatest empires on earth could be driven back, undermined and ultimately removed by the will of the people.

Here at Sologheadbeg, the War for Irish Independence began.  Here also the War of Independence for oppressed peoples the world over began.  Young men and women of Tipperary led the fight, young men and women who were unapologetic and unafraid to take action against their oppressor, in this case, the British Empire.

It is my great privilege to serve the people of Tipperary as their representative in Dáil Éireann today.  I look back on the action here at Sologheadbeg with the greatest of pride but also knowing that there is much work left to be done if we are to finish what was started here a century ago.  The name of the oppressor may have changed but there is still a need for those courageous men and women of Tipperary to continue what was started here in Sologheadbeg a century ago and to build a 32 county Irish republic where all of the children of the nation are cherished equally.

 

 

——————————————————————–3rd Tipperary Brigade Commemoration of Sologheadbeg Ambush-Beginning of War of Independence
Tomorrow, Sunday January 20
People To Congregate at Coffey’s Forge at 2 PM
March Behind Moycarkey Seán Treacy Pipe Band to Ambush Site
Oration by Labhrás Ó Murchú

—————————————————————–We Would Still Be Under The Queen if it Was Left To Fintan O’Toole and Eoghan Harris Who Have Denounced The Action at Soloheadbeg

We are proud of the action of the Tipp volunteers at Soloheadbeg  https://wp.me/pKzXa-12n 

After the 1916 Proclamation and the Execution of The 1916 Leaders anybody wearing a crown uniform while enforcing British Law in Ireland was waging war on the Irish People

Prof Silke:”First, the IRA military campaign was particularly focused on the police as the primary target, rather than the British Army, and this focus was arguably the crucial factor in the IRA’s overall success.—This encouraged many officers to resign or retire, and it also seriously deterred local recruits from joining the force.” Professor Silke, Univ of E. London.

Targetting The RIC Was Crucial in Forcing The British To Negotiate

Professor Andrew Silke

Cranfield University · Cranfield Forensic Institute and Formerly

 University of East London (UEL)

https://www.uel.ac.uk/staff/s/andrew-silke

Professor Andrew Silke (BSc Hons, AFBPsS, CSci, CPsych, PhD) holds a Chair in Criminology at the University of East London

 

Ferocious Times: The IRA, the RIC, and Britain’s failure in 1919-1921. Prof  Andrew Silke

Full Academic Paper  http://roar.uel.ac.uk/4953/1/Ferocious%20Times%20-%20distribution%20version.pdf

Targeting Policing In Ireland In assessing the fundamentals of the IRA’s overall strategy – and bearing in mind its evolving nature – some core elements emerge. First, the military campaign was particularly focused on the police as the primary target, rather than the British Army, and this focus was arguably the crucial factor in the IRA’s overall success.

There was however a sustained campaign of intimidation against the RIC by the IRA. This encouraged many officers to resign or retire, and it also seriously deterred local recruits from joining the force. In order to make up the shortfall – and also to meet targets to expand the force as the conflict continued – large numbers of recruits from Britain would ultimately be brought in, radically changing the character and outlook of the force, and intensifying the conflict between it and the IRA. Indeed, if there was a central core to the IRA’s strategy in the conflict, it was that the primary enemy in the field was the RIC and that victory or defeat lay in destroying the RIC’s ability to operate amid, and integrate with, local communities.

There were two significant police forces active in the country in 1919. The Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) were responsible for policing in Dublin City and County, and had a strength of 1200. Significantly, the DMP also housed G Division. This was the lead unit for gathering and co-ordinating intelligence on the IRA. Though its role was absolutely vital, it was chronically understaffed with just 10 officers. Even worse it was fatally compromised by the fact that three of these officers were strongly sympathetic to 5 the IRA, and were independently passing a steady stream of intelligence to the IRA about the activities and information of the section. While the DMP possessed 10 percent of the police strength in Ireland at the start of the conflict, they would suffer very few casualties in the ensuing 30 months of violence, just 11 officers killed. This represented only 2.5 percent of police fatalities in the conflict.11 The IRA recognised from the beginning that most members of the DMP were anti-British in outlook, and strongly apathetic about enforcing actions against the IRA.12 A deliberate policy was introduced then to avoid attacking and killing DMP officers. An exception however was made for active officers in G Division who ignored warnings from the IRA to curb their “zeal”. Such men were targeted heavily, especially in the opening stage of the conflict. While only 15 police officers were killed in the country in 1919, five of these were DMP officers, mainly detectives connected to G Division. Another five were killed in 1920, again with active detectives being singled out. The DMP’s apathetic stance to the conflict was well recognised by other parts of the British security forces, with the head of the British Army in Ireland warning the government in August 1920 that “The Dublin Metropolitan Police are, in my opinion, quite past redemption” and that soldiers were needed to perform any effective anti-IRA policing operations in the city.13 The situation with regard to the other major police force in the country was different. The Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) was the primary police force in Ireland and was responsible for everywhere apart from Dublin.14 In 1919, the force had just over 9000 officers, but was below its normal compliment of about 10,000. These men were thinly spread throughout the country in a total of 1299 barracks. A few of the larger city barracks could have close to a 100 officers stationed with them, but the vast majority were far smaller, and most rural barracks were very simple affairs with only 5 officers manning them.15 As the violence escalated these barracks would be a major target for IRA attacks and the smaller bases in particular would prove to be highly vulnerable. While the IRA followed a largely hands off approach with regard to the DMP, this did not apply to the RIC. It is worth, however, noting the slow build up in violence. In the first year, just 15 police officers were killed in total, and for the only time, the larger RIC actually suffered proportionally less at this stage than the DMP. There was however a sustained campaign of intimidation against the RIC. This encouraged many officers to resign or retire, and it also seriously deterred local recruits from joining the force. In order to make up the shortfall – and also to meet targets to expand the force as the conflict continued – large numbers of recruits from Britain would ultimately be brought in, radically changing the character and outlook of the force, and intensifying the conflict between it and the IRA. Indeed, if there was a central core to the IRA’s strategy in the conflict, it was that the primary enemy in the field was the RIC and that victory or defeat lay in destroying the RIC’s ability to operate amid, and integrate with, local communities. 6 Statistics kept by the authorities suggested that the RIC were the direct targets of about 18 percent of IRA ‘incidents’.16 This might suggest that the IRA’s primary focus may have lain elsewhere, but a more accurate sense of the IRA’s priorities can be seen in figure 1 which describes the deaths suffered by the security forces in Ireland. While attacks against military targets did increase to reflect the growing role played by the British Army as the conflict progressed, overall most of the casualties suffered by the security forces were police officers.17 Not only were they the targets of serious violence, they were also the targets of systematic campaigns of intimidation and ostracism. The intent of these was to isolate the police from local communities and to have the force increasingly seen as an occupying security organisation. In many parts of the country family members and friends of police officers were attacked and in a few cases killed. Locals who worked in any capacity to support the police were harassed and threatened.18 Women who associated with police officers were assaulted and had their hair cut off. Shopkeepers refused to serve police officers and their families. In Church, people refused to sit on the same aisles as RIC men and their families. “Join the RAF and See The World. Join the RIC and See the Next” proclaimed graffiti daubed on street walls.19 Figure 1: Security Personnel Killed in Ireland, 1919 – July 11th, 1921 Statistics drawn from: Abbott (2000) and http://www.cairogang.com/soldiers‐ killed/CAUSE_OF_DEATH/KIA/killed‐in‐action.html 7 The result was that recruitment to the police force within most of Ireland collapsed, while resignations massively increased.20 The force lost a very large proportion of its native officers, and with them their strong local links and knowledge. The shortfall was only made up by recruiting thousands of men from Britain, primarily ex-military who had been demobilised after the Great War, almost all of whom were Protestant, and most of whom came from large British towns and cities.21 The police transformed from an organisation whose members broadly reflected the demographics of local communities, to one which was increasingly alien. In background, temperament and religion, the officers were increasingly poorly placed to connect effectively with the population and environment around them. All of which inevitably fed into the IRA’s narrative that the police were a foreign force of occupation.

 

 

1 There were a handful of incidents outside of Dublin, but apart from the killing of 16 policemen in an ambush in Co. Meath, nothing of any significance happened elsewhere, see for example: Robert Kee, Ireland: A History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson; 1980).

2 Charles Townshend, Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (London: Allen Lane, 2005).

3 Robert Kee (note 1) p.172.

4 Tim Pat Coogan, Michael Collins (London: Hutchinson 1990).

5 A point accepted by most historians of the conflict. See for example Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Charles Townshend, The Republic: The Fight For Irish Independence (London: Allen Lane, 2013).

6 ‘The work before us’, An tÓglach, February 1, 1919, p.2.

7 Indeed, some historians have argued that it is a mistake to view the Soloheadbeg ambush in January 1919 as the starting point of the conflict, and that later stages represent a more realistic beginning. See, for example Joost Augusteijn, “Reviews of Books”. The American Historical Review 108.4 (2003): 1218– 1219; and also Peter Hart, The I.R.A. at War, 1916-1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

8 There is still debate around the exact death-toll, though these particular figures are drawn from Michael Hopkinson’s estimates which are generally regarded as among the most reliable: Michael Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence (Dublin: Gill and McMillan, 2002), pp.201-202.

9 For an excellent account of this conflict see Edward Paice, Tip and Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2007). 19

10 An indication of just how von Lettow-Vorbeck’s campaign was viewed can be seen in the pages of the IRA’s official newsletter during the conflict, An tÓglach. For example: General Lettow-Vorbeck’s campaign in East Africa affords perhaps more valuable instruction for the employment of the Irish Republican Army in its present circumstances than any other campaign that was ever fought. ‘Lessons from East Africa: 1’, An tÓglach, April 13, 1920, p.4 In general, analyses of guerrilla conflicts from a variety of eras and different locations were a frequent subject in the pages of the newsletter.

11 Statistics drawn from Richard Abbott, Police Casualties in Ireland, 1919-1922 (Cork: Mercier Press, 2000); and James Scannell, “DMP Casualties During the War of Independence,” Dublin Historical Record 61, no.1 (2008): 5–19. In particular, Abbott’s statistics on police deaths as a result of the conflict are the most comprehensive available and are relied on here. It is worth noting that a variety of other sources give conflicting figures, some higher, some lower, but none can match the extensive detail provided by Abbott.

12 James Scannell, (note 11).

13 Cabinet Memorandum: The Present Military Situation in Ireland and the Proposed Military Policy During the Coming Winter, General Macready, 6th August, 1920. CAB/24/110 Image Reference:0050

14 John Brewer, The Royal Irish Constabulary: An Oral History (Institute of Irish Studies, Queen’s University of Belfast, 1990).

15 Richard Abbott, (note 11), pp.57-58.

16 W.J. Lowe, ‘The war against the R.I.C., 1919-21,’ Eire-Ireland 37, no.3-4 (2002): 79-117.

17 Richard Abbott, (note 11).

18 Richard English, (note 5), p.21.

19 Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows (London: Little Brown, 1994), p.195.

20 Jim Herlihy, The Royal Irish Constabulary: A Short History and Genealogical Guide (Dublin: Four Courts Press 1997).

21 Richard Abbott, (note 11), p.92.

22 ‘Our Duty’, An tÓglach, June 15 1920 p.2

23 Figures taken from Cabinet Weekly Survey of the State of Ireland Memorandum, July 29, 1921, PRO CAB 24/126/72, p.4.

24 Michael Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence (Dublin: Gill and McMillan, 2002), p.21.

25 Charles Townshend, (note 5).

26 W.H. Kautt (ed), Ground Truths: British Army Operations in the Irish War of Independence. (Sallins: Irish Academic Press, 2014), p.2.

27 Charles Townshend, (note 5), p.135.

28 Cabinet Weekly Survey of the State of Ireland Memorandum, July 29, 1921, PRO CAB 24/126/72

29 Expenditure on Imperial Services in Ireland (Circulated for information, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer), June 3, 1921, (PRO CAB 24/125).

30 W.H. Kautt (ed), (note 26), p.65.

31 William Sheehan, British Voices: From the Irish War of Independence 1918-1921. (Cork: Collins Press 2005), pp.151-152.

32 Notably in: The Record of the Rebellion in Ireland, 1919-1921 and the Part Played by the Army in Dealing with It (WO 141/93).

33 W.H. Kautt (ed), (note 26), p.186.

34 The Military Situation In Ireland at the end of September, 1921

35 Report by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief on the situation in Ireland for the week ending 9th July, 1921

36 Richard Abbott, (note 11).

37 William Sheehan, (note 31), pp.227-228.

38 Ibid., pp.90-91.

39 Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, December 29, 1920 (PRO CAB 23/23/25).

40 Ibid.

41 Report by the General Officer Commanding in Chief, The Situation in Ireland for the Week Ending 14th May, 1921 (PRO CAB 24/123). 20

42 ‘The Present Military Situation in Ireland and the Proposed Military Policy During the Coming Winter,’ Memorandum by General Macready, August 6, 1920 (PRO CAB 24/110/50).

43 ‘The Irish Situation’, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, November 3, 1920 (PRO CAB 23/23/2).

44 Memorandum “B” By the Commander-In-Chief, The Forces in Ireland, (PRO CAB 24/123).

45 Memorandum “A” By the Commander-In-Chief, The Forces in Ireland, (PRO CAB 24/123).

46 Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, (PRO CAB 24/123).

47 ‘Ireland and the General Military Situation’, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, May 1921, (PRO CAB 24/123).

48 What is interesting is that apart from the considerable destruction caused on the first day, a significant amount of additional damage was also done to the building and material inside (including files) over subsequent days. It turned out that the Dublin Fire Brigade were less than enthusiastic about tackling the blaze, and after fires repeatedly broke out again over the following days, soldiers had to take over firefighting duties. As much as anything else, the Fire Brigade’s apathy was yet another indictment of the lack of support the British authorities enjoyed in most of Ireland outside of Ulster at this stage. See: Report by the General Officer Commanding in Chief, The Situation in Ireland for the Week Ending 28 May, 1921 (PRO CAB 24/123).

49 ‘The Military Situation in Ireland’, Memorandum by Colonel Sir Hugh Elles, 24th June, 1921. (PRO CAB 24/125/77), pp.1-2.

50 As quoted in W.J. Lowe, (note 16) p.117. 51 William Sheehan, (note 31), pp.151-152.

Professor Andrew Silke  Dec 2017

Cranfield University · Cranfield Forensic Institute and formerly

 University of East London (UEL)    

https://www.uel.ac.uk/staff/s/andrew-silke  

Full Paper at the link above        Full Citation Below

 

CITATION On Appointment of Prof Silke

Cranfield University has partnered with insurance scheme Pool Re to appoint Professor Andrew Silke as Professor of Terrorism Risk Management and Resilience.

As part of the role, which will be co-funded by Cranfield and Pool Re for an initial five-year period, Professor Silke will also be responsible for the establishment of a new Centre for Excellence in Counterterrorism.

The Centre will provide thought leadership in catastrophic and unconventional terrorism loss assessment and mitigation, with the aim of improving resilience to the UK economy.

Sir Peter Gregson, Vice-Chancellor and Chief Executive of Cranfield University, said: “Cranfield University is delighted to be working with Pool Re on this important topic. Cranfield’s strengths in defence and security are widely recognised. This new chair that Pool Re is supporting augments our existing expertise and ensures UK government and industry has enhanced access to world-class expertise.

“By jointly establishing a Centre for Excellence in Counterterrorism, Pool Re and Cranfield University will undertake academic research and study, collate and share data and work with government and other institutions to create, disseminate and publicise the nature of, and threat from, terrorism as well as ways in which the threat could be mitigated.”

Julian Enoizi, Chief Executive of Pool Re said: “The appointment of Professor Andrew Silke represents the important first step towards building a world-leading resource into the study and analysis of terrorism, risk mitigation and resilience.

“Pool Re recognises the importance of engaging business, academia and government in tackling all forms of extremism and this appointment will help leverage the growing relationship between the public and private sectors.”

Professor Andrew Silke is internationally recognised as a leading expert on terrorism and low intensity conflict. His primary research interests include terrorism, conflict, crime and policing, and he currently holds a Chair in Criminology at the University of East London where he was Head of Criminology and the Programme Director for Terrorism Studies.

Silke has a background in forensic psychology and criminology and has worked both in academia and for government.

He will be assuming his new appointment on the 31 January 2018

—————————————————————————————-FREE STATERS, Representing the Irish Rich, WERE MORE MURDEROUS THAN THE BLACK AND TANS—-4 of THE SEVENTY SEVEN WERE EXECUTED IN ROSCREA, 9 MORE REPUBLICAN PRISONERS MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD IN CUSTODY IN TIPPERARY

FREE STATE EXECUTIONS POLICY

http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/4069/1/The_Government%27s_Executions_Policy_During_the_Irish_Civil_War_1922_-_1923_%28Breen_Murphy_-_62129007%29.pdf

O‘Dwyer, Martin, Seventy-seven of mine said Ireland (Cork, 2006)

BL MONTGOMERY(MONTY) WHO HAD COMMANDED BRITISH FORCES IN CORK DURING THE CIVIL WAR SAID: “The only way forward therefore (for Britain) was to give them [the Irish] some form of self-government, and let them squash the rebellion themselves; they are the only people who could really stamp it out, and they are still trying to do so and as far as one can tell they seem to be having a fair amount of success” https://wp.me/pKzXa-12n

http://www.theirishstory.com/2012/11/25/british-military-involvement-in-the-irish-civil-war/#.XDn-31X7SM8

As Bernard Montgomery(MONTY), erstwhile commander of British forces in Cork wrote in the very different circumstances of mid 1923, after the last British garrisons had left the Free State and when the IRA guerrillas were surrendering and being arrested in droves by the Free State army; ‘We [the British Army] could probably have squashed the [IRA 1919-21] rebellion as a temporary measure, but it would have broken out again like an ulcer the moment we removed the troops… The only way therefore was to give them [the Irish] some form of self-government, and let them squash the rebellion themselves; they are the only people who could really stamp it out, and they are still trying to do so and as far as one can tell they seem to be having a fair amount of success.’[13]

[13] Quoted in Padraig  O Ruairc, Blood on the Banner, p267

British Voices from the Irish war of independence 1918-1921 by William Sheehan published by Collins. It draws on the archived reports and manuscripts of Brit officers from the time. Quite interesting to read independent corroboration of the outlawyery of the Auxies and BnTs but also the condescension of said officers towards the Irish generally. Another quote from Monty ” my own view is that to win a war like this you must be ruthless. Oliver Cromwell or the Germans would have settled it in a very short time, sadly, nowadays public opinion precludes such methods”

British Military Involvement in the Irish Civil War | The Irish Story

 

 

www.theirishstory.com/2012/11/…/british-military-involvement-in-the-irish-civil-war/

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New Verse-The Galtee Mountain Boy

 

If one missed the third line of the first verse-“arrested by free-staters and sentenced for to die”, a person would be forgiven for thinking that the song was a war of independence song rather than an anti-free-state song. I hope my link verse 2(A) will clarify the meaning of the song. Can I ask somebody with much more song-writing ability than mine to rewrite the verse!!! Christy Moore please help! https://wp.me/pKzXa-12n

2(a) By Paddy Healy

Bound for Dubin City to Fight the Free State Foe,

To Join our Faithful Leaders, Liam, Rory, Dick and Joe,

But the Four Courts had surrendered, so home we had to go.

To Defend the Galtee Mountains and the Glen of Aherlow!

Galtee Mountain Boy by Patsy O’Halloran

(1)

I joined the flying column in19 and16
In Cork with Sean Moylan ,Tipperary with DanBreen
Arrested by free-staters and sentenced for to die
Farewell to Tipperary said the Galtee mountain boy

[2]
We went across the vallys and over the hilltops green
Where we met with Dinny Lacey,Sean Hogan and Dan Breen
Sean Moylan and his gallant men they kept the flag flying high
Farewell to Tipperary said the Galtee mountain boy

New Verse—by Paddy Healy

2(a)

Bound for Dubin City to Fight the Free State Foe,

To Join our Faithful Leaders, Liam, Rory, Dick and Joe,

But the Four Courts had surrendered, so home we had to go.

To Defend the Galtee Mountains and the Glen of Aherlow!

[3]
We tracked the Dublin mountains we were rebels on the run
Though hunted night and morning we were outlaws but free men
We tracked the Wicklow mountains as the sun was shining high
Farewell to Tipperary said the Galtee mountain boy

[4] By Christie Moore
I bid farewell to old Clonmel that I never more will see
And to the Galtee mountain that oft times sheltered me
The men who fought for their liberty and who died without a sigh
May their cause be ne’er forgotten said the Galtee mountain boy

 

—————————————————————————

Over the Next 5 years, Irish People  Will be Commemorating The War of Independence and the Civil War.

I will be attempting to set out here the developments in County Tipperary and West Waterford in that period.

https://wp.me/pKzXa-12n

The first shots of the War of Independence were,of course, fired in Co Tipperary at Soloheadbeg.

But in addition to military engagements, these developments included:  election to the first All-Ireland Dáil, seizure of creameries by workers (“creamery soviets”), general strike against conscription , strikes in support of hunger strikers, seizure of land of big land owners, strikes of farm  labourers for better pay and conditions,  strikes of transport workers against movement of British troops and munitions etc.

I start to-day near the end of the Civil War in May 1923.

95 Years Ago To-day, on Feb 18, 1923 Tipperary Anti-Treaty Leader Dinny Lacey Was Shot and Killed By Free State Forces

In December 1921, his unit split over the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Lacey opposed the Treaty and most of his men followed suit. Lacey took over command of the Third Tipperary Brigade as Seamus Robinson was appointed to command the anti-Treaty IRA’s Second Southern Division. In the ensuing civil war (June 1922-May 1923), he organised guerrilla activity in the Tipperary area against Irish Free State (pro-Treaty) forces.

He was killed in an action against Free State troops at Ballydavid, near Bansha in the Glen of Aherlow on 18 February 1923. He was 33 years old.Over 1,000 Free State troops, under the command of General John T. Prout, with the intention of breaking up his guerrilla unit, converged on the Glen where he and four other men from his column were billeted. Lacey and one of his men were killed and others captured.

——————————————————————————————————————————

Anti-Free State Ballad :The Galtee Mountain Boy-Video Below

‘The Galtee Mountain Boy’
(By Patsy Halloran)

Performed by John Breen
Stair na hÉireann/History of Ireland

I joined the flying column in nineteen and sixteen
In Cork with Sean Moylan, in Tipperary with Dan Breen
Arrested by free staters and sentenced for to die
Farewell to Tipperary said the Galtee mountain boy

We went across the valleys and over the hilltops green
Where we met with Dinny Lacey, Sean Hogan and Dan Breen
Sean Moylan and his gallant men that kept the flag flying high
Farewell to Tipperary said the Galtee mountain boy

(The ballad is set in Clonmel Jail as the Galtee Mountain Boy awaits execution by the Free State. Having attempted to relieve the Four Courts the South Tipp and West Waterford Rebels retreated southwards from the Dublin mountains where they had linked up with the anti-treaty forces led by Oscar Traynor. They had received word of the surrender of the Four Courts garrison. From the Dublin Mountains they travelled over the Wicklow Mountains back towards Clonmel .-Paddy Healy)

We tracked the Dublin mountains we were rebels on the run
Though hunted night and morning we were outlaws but free men
We tracked the Wicklow mountains as the sun was shining high
Farewell to Tipperary said the Galtee mountain boy

I bid farewell to old Clonmel that I never more will see
And to the Galtee mountains that oft times sheltered me
The men who fought for their liberty and who died without a sigh
May their cause be ne’er forgotten said the Galtee mountain boy

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